For example, suppose X leaves a sum of money to Y according to his will, provided that Y reaches the age of 21. The provision may need to be properly understood under the rules of the legal system that Y is only entitled to the money if he was 21 years old at the time of X`s death. But it may be that the right way to understand it is that Y, even if he has not reached 21, when X dies, acquires a right to money, but he does not have to be paid until the age of 21. A practical difference is that, in the latter case, the right may pass to the titular successor of Y if, after surviving X, Y nevertheless dies before the age of 21. In the latter case, lawyers refer to the right as “acquired”. There can be many complex legal regulations regarding this type of situation, and they vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Reference should be made to textbooks, in particular on testamentary succession, in the jurisdiction. Legal rights are clearly rights that exist under legal systems or decisions of competent authorities in those jurisdictions. They raise a number of different philosophical questions. (1) whether statutory rights are conceptually related to other types of rights, primarily moral rights; 2) What is the analysis of the concept of legal law? (3) What types of businesses may be legitimate right holders; (4) whether there are types of rights that are exclusive to, or at least much more important in, legal systems as opposed to morality; (5) What rights should legal systems create or recognize? Question (5) is primarily a matter of moral and political philosophy and does not generally differ in principle from the question of what duties, permissions, powers, etc. should create or recognize legal systems. It is therefore not dealt with here.

The permissible standard of action in a certain area is called rights. In other words, a right is any act of a person that the law allows. Legal rights differ from a moral or natural right in that it is recognized and protected by law, while the latter may/may be recognized and protected by law. We will now discuss the types of rights in detail. While some (e.g. d`Almeida 2016) have argued that Hohfeld was right when he asserted that civil liberties only include permits, others (e.g. Waldron 1981 and Raz 1984a, 1984b) Hart (1973) had argued, following Bentham, that a right to liberty should be regarded as a bilateral authorization for A, with the obligation of others not to interfere with X`s A-ing. Waldron and Raz argue that an important feature of rights is that they allow the right holder to do not only what is right, but also (within certain limits) what is wrong.

The best explanation for this is that rights only see obligations of non-interference for others and not as granting permission to the right holder. (See also Herstein 2012, 2014.) Another view (Campbell 1997) is to consider certain rights such as licensing, but pointing out that when granting a legal authorization, the law does not say that there can be no grounds against the performance of the act, but only that (within the limits of the authorization) the law will act as if there were none. Legal rights refer to rights under the law. It exists according to the rules of a particular legal system. Non-hereditary rights die with the death of their owner. Example: Not all personality rights are hereditary. An overview of Hart`s theory (1973) can be given as an illustration of the first point of view. According to Hart, someone (call him “X”) can be a legitimate rights holder, mainly in two ways. First, X may have bilateral authorization to perform an act, i.e.

X is authorized to both A and non-A (with some prohibitions for others to interfere). Second, someone else may have an obligation (e.g. to pay £10) over which X has control, mainly by waiver or performance. Since X has a choice in all cases, this explains why he is called the rights holder. One of the difficulties with this type of theory is to explain our apparent reference to rights when there is no choice, for example when one not only has the right to vote, but is also legally required to do so. Dworkin (1973, 1975, 1981, 1986) was a representative of the first point of view in a formulation of his legal theory. Consequently, rights have a categorical primacy over any other consideration that is not itself legally justified. Of course, it is true in many legal systems that constitutional rights, or some of them, should take precedence over any other consideration that does not itself flow from a constitutional right. But this seems to be mainly due to the constitutional status of the law. Both in law and morality, many rights are rather trivial. In morality, these rights can sometimes even be justified by considerations of personal comfort (cf. Raz 1978).

Similarly, it appears in the legislation that many prima facie rights can be overridden by what the court considers to be public interest considerations. Dworkin`s (1977) response to the latter type of criticism was to argue that, on closer inspection, the examination of opposition to the law can itself be seen as instantiating another common law. However, this depends on the controversial assertion that the only considerations on which the courts can legitimately rely are pre-existing rights. It was also objected that, as a general theory of the nature of rights, it might be self-destructive, since then any consideration could be considered to be based on law, which meant that rights did not have a particular role in practical argumentation. (For a discussion of Dworkin`s theory, including its other formulations, see Yowell 2007.) In constitutional law, rights are classified as natural, civil and political. Natural rights are those that are supposed to flow from the nature of the individual and depend on his personality, such as the right to life, liberty, privacy and the pursuit of happiness. Of the four basic types of rights that Hohfeld purported to identify, immunities pose problems, albeit somewhat different. Immunity arises when Y is not entitled to change X`s legal position. But is immunity itself a right, or is it simply a means of protecting a right, that is, by shielding it from deletion or modification? As with the powers, views diverged. Civil rights are those that belong to every citizen of the state and are not affiliated with the organization or administration of the government. These include property rights, marriage, protection by law, freedom of contract, jury trials, etc. These rights may be enforced or corrected in a civil action before the courts.

RIGHT. This word is used in different meanings: 1. Sometimes it means a law, as when we say that natural law obliges us to keep our promises, or that it offers reparation, or that it forbids murder. In our language, it is rarely used in this sense. 2. This sometimes means that quality in our actions, by which they are designated only as such. This is generally referred to as justice. 3. It is the quality of a man by which he can perform certain deeds or possess certain things which belong to him by virtue of a title. In this sense, we use it when we say that a man has a right to his property or to defend himself. Ruth, Inst.

c. 2, §§ 1, 2, 3; Merlin; Repert. of Jurisp. word Right. See Wood`s Inst. 119.2. Will this word be considered here in the latter sense only? The law is the correlative of duty, for wherever one has a right to which he is entitled, another must owe him a duty. 1 toull. No. 96.

3. Rights are perfect and imperfect. If the things we have the right to possess, or the acts to which we are entitled, are or can be fixed and destined, the right is perfect; But if the thing or the actions are vague and indefinite, the law is imperfect. If a man demands his property, which is denied to him, the right that supports his claim is perfect; For the thing required is, or can be, determined and determined. 4. But if a poor person asks for help from those from whom he has reason to expect, the law which supports his request is imperfect; Because the relief he expects is a vaguely vague thing. Pity. Inst. v. 2, para. 4; Grot.

free. 1, c. para. 4. 5. Rights are also absolute and nuanced. A man has the absolute right to recover property belonging to him; The representative has the right to recover such property if it has been entrusted to him and if it has been unlawfully seized from him. Empty Trover. 6. Rights may also be decencyly subdivided into natural and civil rights, but since all the rights that man has received from nature have been modified and newly acquired by civil law, it is more correct to divide them into political and civil rights when examining their object. 7. Political rights consist of the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of a government.

These political rights are set out in the Constitution. Every citizen has the right to elect and be elected; These are the political rights enjoyed by the humblest citizen. 8. Civil rights are those that are not related to the establishment, support or administration of government. These consist of the power to acquire and enjoy property, to exercise paternal and matrimonial power, etc. It will be observed that if everyone is not deprived of it by a civil sentence of death, he enjoys his civil rights, which is not the case with political rights; For a foreigner, for example, has no political rights, although he fully exercises his civil rights.